Concrete scenario
What this looks like in practice
A newsroom receives a viral video clip. The uploader claims it shows an event timestamped yesterday. Editors have only the MP4 forwarded through messaging apps — EXIF is gone, thumbnails were re-encoded, compression artifacts abound, and the origin account is anonymous.
Problem
What breaks today
Media spreads faster than metadata. Re-uploads, crops, screen shots, and CDN transforms strip context; reviewers still need to know whether visible pixels match a signed version independent of the original hosting app.
Mechanism
How ZK-SNAP responds
Receipts bind content fingerprints, transformation trails, and public claims at capture or publish time. C2PA-compatible bridge artifacts can compose in ext_* commitments while ZK-SNAP remains the portable verification kernel for machine actions around the asset.
Verifiable outcome
What a verifier can check
- Media digest under the declared profile matches inputs_root or committed openings.
- Transformation claims disclose edits explicitly bound in the receipt.
- Sigil S4 proves offline validity; S5 requires anchor evidence.
- C2PA bridge commitments verify independently before matching ext_* digests.
Scope boundary
What a receipt does not replace
Provenance receipts prove signed capture and publish facts — not semantic truth of depicted events, deepfake detection alone, or editorial judgment about newsworthiness.